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Abstract
Mutualisms	are	widespread,	yet	their	evolution	has	received	less	theoretical	attention	
than	within-	species	social	behaviors.	Here,	we	extend	previous	models	of	uncondi-
tional	pairwise	interspecies	social	behavior,	to	consider	selection	for	donation	but	also	
for	 donation-	suppressing	 modifiers.	We	 present	 conditions	 under	 which	 modifiers	
that	suppress	costly	donation	receive	either	positive	or	negative	selection;	assortment	
only	at	the	donation	 locus	always	 leads	to	selection	for	donation	suppression,	as	 in	
within-	species	 greenbeard	 traits.	 However,	 genomewide	 assortment	 with	 modifier	
loci	can	lead	to	intermediate	levels	of	donation,	and	these	can	differ	in	the	two	species	
even	when	payoffs	from	donation	are	additive	and	symmetric.	When	costly	donation	
between	species	can	evolve	without	being	suppressed,	we	argue	that	 it	 is	most	ap-
propriately	explained	by	 indirect	 fitness	benefits	within	 the	donating	species,	using	
partner	species	as	vectors	for	altruism.	Our	work	has	implications	for	identifying	both	
the	stability	and	the	ultimate	beneficiaries	of	social	behavior	between	species.
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1  | INTRODUCTION
Inclusive	fitness	theory	explains	the	evolution	of	altruistic	traits	that	
help	 conspecifics	 at	 a	 lifetime	personal	 fitness	 cost	 to	 their	bearers	
(Hamilton,	1964a,b).	When	individuals	within	a	species	are	genetically	
related,	altruism	can	evolve	because	an	actor	can	compensate	 for	a	
lifetime	cost	to	reproduction	by	helping	recipients	that	are	genetically	
similar.	In	this	way,	the	recipients’	offspring	can	effectively	replace	the	
actor’s	offspring	in	the	gene	pool.	However,	social	behavior	can	also	
occur	between	species,	and	there	is	growing	empirical	and	theoretical	
interest	in	understanding	the	evolution	of	mutualism,	which	abounds	
in	natural	communities	and	is	central	to	ecosystem	form	and	function	
(Archetti	 et	al.,	 2011;	 Bull	 &	 Rice,	 1991;	 Fletcher	&	Doebeli,	 2009;	
Fletcher	 &	 Zwick,	 2006;	 Foster	 &	Wenseleers,	 2006;	 Frank,	 1994,	
1997;	 Gardner,	 West,	 &	 Wild,	 2011;	 Herre,	 Knowlton,	 Mueller,	 &	
Rehner,	1999).	Yet,	the	evolution	of	mutualism	is	arguably	not	as	well	
understood	as	the	evolution	of	within-	species	social	behavior.
To	 further	 develop	mutualism	 theory,	 here	we	 present	 a	 simple	
multilocus	model	of	donation	between	species,	where	 individuals	of	
each	species	are	given	the	opportunity	to	pay	a	cost	to	help	a	member	
of	the	other	species.	Others	have	considered	similar	systems	from	a	
community	selection	perspective	(Goodnight,	1990);	here,	we	analyze	
selection	at	only	a	single	level,	noting	that	the	multilevel	selection	and	
inclusive	fitness	theory	approaches	make	identical	predictions	on	the	
direction	of	selection	(Marshall,	2011,	2015).
Our	model	describes	the	evolution	of	costly	donation,	and	suppres-
sion	of	donation.	We	are	particularly	interested	in	when	suppression	
of	 such	donation	will	 and	will	not	be	stable,	and	compare	scenarios	
whose	main	difference	is	whether	association	between	species	occurs	
at	 a	 subset	 of	 their	 genomes,	 or	 is	 genomewide.	We	 analyze	 three	
cases;	in	the	first,	assortment	at	behavior-	generating	loci	brings	het-
erospecific	bearers	of	donation	alleles	together	more	frequently	than	
expected	under	uniformly	random	assortment.	However,	 it	does	not	
assort	based	on	the	other,	potentially	donation-	suppressing,	locus;	in	
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other	words,	assortment	is	local	rather	than	across	the	entire	genome.	
This	 is	analogous	to	an	obligate	greenbeard	scenario	within	a	single	
species;	when	the	donation	behavior	is	expressed,	it	is	disproportion-
ately	aimed	at	other	bearers	of	the	donation	allele.	In	the	second	case,	
genomewide	assortment	based	on	genotypes,	a	kind	of	 interspecies	
relatedness,	 governs	 interactions;	 this	 is	 intended	 to	 correspond,	 as	
much	as	possible,	with	Hamilton’s	scenario	for	altruism	in	kin	groups.	
In	 this	 case,	 assortment	 is	no	 longer	 local.	Finally,	we	alter	 the	 sec-
ond	 case	 to	 consider	 a	 facultative	 greenbeard	 situation,	 in	 which	
donators	only	donate	 to	other	donators.	We	analyze	all	 cases	using	
quasi-	linkage	equilibrium	 (QLE)	 (Kimura,	1965;	Kirkpatrick,	Johnson,	
&	 Barton,	 2002)	 and	 stochastic	 simulation	 approaches.	We	 present	
conditions	under	which	modifiers	that	suppress	individually	costly	do-
nation	receive	either	positive	or	negative	selection.	These	conditions	
are	similar	to	Hamilton’s	rule	and	are	conceptually	similar	to	analyses	
of	selection	acting	on	greenbeard	traits	within	species.	We	also	pres-
ent	conditions	under	which	intermediate	levels	of	donation	in	the	two	
partner	species	are	stable	and	further	conditions	under	which	these	
levels	differ	in	the	two	species.	We	then	consider	how	to	characterize	
these	interspecies	social	behaviors.
2  | MATERIALS AND METHODS
In	order	to	study	the	evolutionary	stability	of	mutualism,	we	analyze	
models	in	which	individuals	of	two	species	randomly	pair	up	and	have	
the	possibility	to	help	each	other.	We	focus	on	a	simple	pairwise	sce-
nario	because	 this	 reduces	 the	potential	 for	within-	species	 altruism	
that	might	be	mistaken	for	between-	species	altruism;	for	example,	a	
honeybee	collects	nectar	while	pollinating	a	plant	but	uses	it	to	raise	
siblings	 rather	 than	 offspring	 (Foster	 &	 Wenseleers,	 2006;	 Frank,	
1994;	Wyatt,	West,	 &	 Gardner,	 2013).	 Nevertheless,	 we	 return	 to	
such	examples	in	the	discussion.
Previous	models	seeking	to	understand	interspecies	social	behav-
ior	have	focussed	on	unconditional	behavior	governed	by	single	 loci	
(Foster	 &	Wenseleers,	 2006;	 Frank,	 1994;	Wyatt	 et	al.,	 2013).	 Our	
models	consider	the	evolution	of	the	loci	that	drive	donation	toward	
a	second	species,	but	also	of	modifiers	acting	to	suppress	that	dona-
tion.	We	also	consider,	alternatively,	modifiers	that	allow	individuals	to	
refuse	social	partners	according	to	their	genotype.	The	general	model	
assumes	biallelic	loci	for	donation
and	suppressing	donation
Then,	personal	fitness	is	defined	as
where	primes	indicate	partner’s	genotype	(where	the	partner	is	from	
a	different	species)	for	the	trait	in	question,	and	b	and	c	are,	respec-
tively,	 the	 fitness	 benefits	 and	 costs	 of	 prosocial	 behavior	 received	
from	and	given	to	members	of	the	other	species.	Note	that	individuals	
only	donate	if	they	possess	the	donation	allele	but	lack	the	suppres-
sion	allele,	in	which	case	they	are	referred	to	as	donators;	individuals	
that	only	hold	 the	donation	allele	 shall	be	 referred	 to	as	bearers	of	
the	donation	allele.	Note	our	use	of	 the	 term	“donator”	 rather	 than	
“donor”;	this	is	to	convey	that	these	individuals	donate	only	under	the	
right	circumstances,	which	vary	between	the	three	considered	cases.	
Importantly,	we	can	use	this	model	to	ensure	a	lifetime	personal	fit-
ness	cost	associated	with	donation,	by	specifying	that	each	individual	
only	 interacts	once	during	 its	 lifetime	and	 is	 randomly	assigned	 the	
role	of	either	potential	donor	or	potential	recipient	(Quickfall,	2016).
Given	the	above	model,	donation	is	altruistic	whenever	b > c > 0; 
note	 that	 fecundity	 and	 personal	 fitness	 are	 equivalent	 in	 this	
case,	 as	 local	 competition	 is	assumed	not	 to	 take	place	 (Hamilton,	
1964a,b;	Taylor,	1992;	Wyatt	et	al.,	2013).	Our	model	makes	use	of	
the	 neighbor-	modulated	 fitness	method	 of	 analyzing	 social	 evolu-
tion	(Taylor	&	Frank,	1996),	where	“neighbors”	are	members	of	the	
partner	species.	We	take	the	simplest	case	in	which	additive	fitness	
costs,	 benefits,	 and	 assortment	 are	 the	 same	 from	 both	 species’	
points	of	view;	it	is	then	sufficient	to	focus	on	only	one	of	the	spe-
cies	to	ask	whether	personally	costly	donation	in	that	species	is	ever	
stable.
We	analyze	 this	model	 using	 three	methods,	 the	Price	equation	
(Appendices	 S1–3),	QLE	 (Appendix	 S4:	 Section	 4.2.1),	 and	 stochas-
tic	simulation	(Appendix	S4:	Section	4.2.2).	Analytic	discussion	of	the	
Price	 approach	 is	 restricted	 to	 the	 appendix,	 as	 is	 some	 further	 ex-
planation	of	 the	other	 two	approaches.	The	QLE	 approach	 involves	
deterministically	updating	allele	and	genotype	frequencies	with	each	
generation,	according	to	recursive	equations	subject	to	the	QLE	ap-
proximation	discussed	by	Kirkpatrick	et	al.	(2002).	This	requires	weak	
selection	relative	to	recombination;	the	exact	constraints	are	discussed	
in	Appendix	S4:	Section	4.2.1.	The	stochastic	approach	is	applied	to	
the	same	scenarios	as	the	QLE	analysis,	but	introduces	stochasticity	
and	drops	the	QLE	assumption	of	weak	selection;	this	allows	us	to	test	
the	robustness	of	our	results	to	stochasticity	and	strong	selection.	In	
both	the	QLE	and	simulation	approaches,	the	two	species	are	assumed	
to	have	constant	and	equal	population	size.
We	first	consider	assortment	on	a	single	 locus.	This	 is	 similar	 to	
the	thought-	experiment	introduced	by	Fletcher	and	Doebeli	(2009)	in	
which	a	hypothetical	experimenter	manipulates	interactions	such	that	
donating	 genotypes	 in	 each	 species	 are	 always	 paired	 (i.e.,	 if	G	=	1,	
then	G′	=	1,	 and	vice	versa);	 the	main	difference	with	 this	 is	 the	 in-
troduction	of	 the	suppression	 locus	 in	our	model	which,	crucially,	 is	
not	subject	to	assortment	in	our	first	scenario.	In	the	second	scenario,	
genomewide	assortment	is	introduced	that	matches	the	genotypes	at	
donation	and	modifier	loci	between	the	two	species	and	consequently	
also	matches	like	phenotypes	(Appendix	S4:	Section	4.1.1).	This	sce-
nario	is	intended	to	correspond	with,	as	much	as	possible,	Hamilton’s	
scenario	 for	 altruism	 in	 kin	 groups,	 and	 represents	 an	 extreme	 test	
case	for	the	evolution	of	costly	donation	between	species,	in	that	we	
assume	it	provides	the	conditions	most	conducive	for	it.
In	both	scenarios,	our	assortment	parameter,	α,	takes	a	value	be-
tween	0	and	1	(representing	uniformly-	at-	random	pairing	and	maximal	
(1)G=
{
1 if donor
0 otherwise
,
(2)X=
{
0 if donation- suppressor
1 otherwise
.
(3)W=G�X�b−GXc,
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assortment,	respectively),	but	the	actual	success	of	assortment	is	also	
dictated	by	the	extent	to	which	same-	genotype	frequencies	differ	be-
tween	 the	 two	populations.	Thus,	complete	genotype	or	phenotype	
matching	is	not	possible	unless	genotype	frequencies	are	identical	in	
the	two	populations	(Gardner	et	al.,	2011).	When	they	are,	this	case	
becomes	 identical	 to	 the	within-	species	 case,	 and	 the	donation	be-
havior	evolves	under	the	familiar	condition	of	α > c/b,	suggesting	that	
the	assortment	parameter	α	resembles	relatedness,	just	as	it	does	in	
single-	population	models	(Grafen,	1979).
Finally,	we	consider	an	additional	scenario	in	which	donators	can	
reject	interactions	with	nondonators,	thus	fulfilling	the	conditions	to	
be	facultative	greenbeards	(Gardner	&	West,	2010).	Genomewide	as-
sortment	is	once	again	applied	here;	the	difference	between	this	and	
the	second	scenario	lies	in	rejection	of	interactions	postassortment.
3  | RESULTS
Our	QLE	and	stochastic	simulation	(Appendix	S4:	Sections	4.2.1	and	
4.2.2)	 approaches	 complement	 the	 Price	 equation	 analysis	 of	 the	
Appendix	(S1–S3)	by	showing	that	when	assortment	occurs	at	a	single	
behavior-	producing	locus	in	each	species,	selection	for	donation	sup-
pression	 always	 occurs.	 Thus,	 under	QLE	 and	 stochastic	 simulation	
analyses,	donation	to	other	species	is	unstable	and	transient.	This	can	
also	be	shown	analytically	by	considering	that	fitness	of	nonsuppres-
sors	is	strictly	greater	than	that	of	suppressors,	if	there	are	some	indi-
viduals	with	the	donation	allele	(Appendix	S4:	Section	4.3.1).
Under	 our	 second	 scenario,	 in	which	 assortment	 between	 spe-
cies	 is	 genomewide	 rather	 than	 simply	 based	on	 a	 single	 locus,	 the	
QLE	analysis	finds	intermediate	levels	of	donation	in	both	species	can	
occur	(Fig.	1,	Appendix	S4:	Section	4.3.2).	When	α > c/b,	there	are	two	
types	of	stable	population	equilibrium;	both	are	functions	of	α,	c	and	
b.	The	first	exhibits	equal	frequencies	of	donation	in	the	two	popula-
tions,	which	increase	linearly	with	α	as	it	exceeds	c/b	(vertical	dashed	
line	in	Fig.	1).	As	α	increases	beyond	the	point	at	which	donation	fre-
quencies	reach	½	(horizontal	dashed	line	in	Fig.	1),	the	frequencies	in	
the	two	populations	diverge.	 In	both	cases,	 the	stable	donation	fre-
quencies	are	dependent	on	α	 and	c/b;	 analytic	expressions	are	pro-
vided	 in	Appendix	 S4:	 Section	 4.3.2.	Our	 results	 agree	 qualitatively	
with	those	of	Foster	and	Wenseleers	(2006),	who	identified	a	low	c/b 
ratio	and	high	between-	species	fidelity	as	two	of	three	primary	factors	
which	encourage	mutualisms	(the	third,	within-	species	relatedness,	is	
not	systematically	varied	in	our	work).	These	results	are	insensitive	to	
whether	or	not	donators	 realize	 a	net	direct	 lifetime	 fitness	benefit	
from	interacting	with	 like	 individuals	 (Appendix	S4:	Section	4.1)	and	
are	robust	to	finite	population	size	and	strong	selection	(Appendix	S4:	
Section	4.3).
We	now	turn	 to	our	 final	 scenario,	 in	which	donators	can	 reject	
interactions	 with	 nondonators	 and	 thus	 act	 similarly	 to	 facultative	
greenbeards	(Gardner	&	West,	2010).	Assortment	remains	genomew-
ide,	as	in	our	second	scenario.	In	this	case,	donation	reaches	fixation	
if	b > c	 (Quickfall,	2016).	Note	that	the	greenbeards	account	for	the	
modifier,	 as	 it	 is	 implicit	 that	 greenbeards	 recognize	 their	 partner’s	
allele	on	the	“modifier”	locus.	Since	greenbeards	may	typically	be	gene	
complexes	 (Gardner	&	West,	2010),	 this	amounts	 to	defining	a	new	
greenbeard	trait	that	includes	the	modifier	 locus.	Thus,	these	green-
beards	 are	 nonetheless	 vulnerable	 to	 additional	modifiers	 that	may	
arise	at	other	loci.	As	with	greenbeards,	as	discussed	below,	the	only	
way	that	unlinked	modifiers	can	receive	negative	selection	is	if	silenc-
ing	the	donation	aspect	of	the	greenbeard	necessarily	leads	to	the	loss	
of	social	benefits	from	other	greenbeards.
4  | DISCUSSION
Our	results	on	the	evolution	of	between-	species	costly	behavior	with	
modifiers	 show	 that	when	 association	 between	 species	 occurs	 at	 a	
subset	of	the	genome	then	suppression	for	donation	at	unassociated	
loci	will	always	receive	positive	selection,	whereas	when	association	
is	genomewide	 then	costly	donation	can	be	stable	when	something	
akin	 to	Hamilton’s	 rule	 is	 satisfied;	as	summarized	 in	Fig.	2,	 this	ex-
actly	matches	the	pattern	for	stability	of	costly	social	behaviors	within	
species,	as	determined	using	inclusive	fitness	and	greenbeard	theory.
Greenbeards	 in	general	are	vulnerable	to	suppression	of	 the	do-
nation	phenotype	while	preserving	the	marker	that	results	in	receipt	
of	benefits.	However,	theoretically	greenbeards	are	not	vulnerable	to	
suppression	when	the	costly	behavior	cannot	be	dissociated	from	the	
marker	 that	 leads	 to	 receipt	 of	 benefits,	 and	 examples	 of	 this	 have	
F IGURE  1 Stable	proportions	of	donators	in	each	species	for	
intermediate	whole-	genomic	assortment	rates	α;	model	parameters	
are	as	described	in	the	appendix.	Stable	donation	evolves	if	α > c/b 
(vertical	dashed	line).	Thus,	something	similar	to	Hamilton’s	rule	then	
predicts	the	evolution	of	donation	between	species.	However,	if	α 
sufficiently	high	such	that	donation	frequency	in	both	populations	
exceeds	½	(horizontal	dashed	line),	more	complex	dynamics	emerge	
and	one	species	will	donate	less	than	the	other	on	average	(Appendix	
S4:	Section	4.2.3.2)
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been	found	in	single	species	such	as	the	csA	gene	in	associations	of	
amoebae	(Fig.	2a)	(Queller,	Ponte,	Bozzaro,	&	Strassmann,	2003)	and	
the	FLO1	gene	in	brewer’s	yeast	(Smukalla	et	al.,	2008),	among	oth-
ers.	What	are	the	biological	parallels	to	greenbeard	associations	and	
whole-	genome	relatedness	in	two	species	associations?	Greenbeard-	
like	association	between	species	at	a	subset	of	their	genomes	may	be	
possible.	For	example,	in	plant–pollinator	associations	(Fig.	2c),	coevo-
lution	 of	 flower	 and	mouthpart	 designs	may	 lead	 to	 stable	 associa-
tion	at	portions	of	the	species’	genomes	associated	with	these	traits,	
yet	 leave	 the	 rest	 of	 the	 genomes	 free	 to	 evolve	modifiers	 to	 sup-
press	the	costly	parts	of	these	traits,	namely	investment	in	specialist	
morphology,	while	still	reaping	the	benefits.	In	this	example,	there	may	
be	evidence	of	this	on	at	least	one	side	of	the	association,	in	the	form	
of	“nectar	robbing”	species	benefiting	from	nectar	without	benefiting	
the	plant	by	aiding	in	pollination	(but	see	Maloof	(2001)	on	whether	
this	reduces	plant	fitness),	and	presumably	thereby	reducing	the	direct	
fitness	cost	of	their	behavior.	However,	the	greenbeard	metaphor	may	
be	rather	stretched	in	such	an	example.	Are	interspecific	stable	green-
beards	 possible	 then?	 One	 candidate	 may	 be	 the	 cellular	 adhesion	
genes	mentioned	above	in	the	context	of	single-	species	associations,	
given	the	prevalence	of	multispecies	microbial	associations	in	the	form	
of	biofilms	(Elias	&	Banin,	2012).
Genomewide	 relatedness	 in	 single	 species	 arises	 in	 family-	
structured	 groups,	 which	 can	 provide	 the	 conditions	 necessary	 for	
the	evolution	of	extreme	altruism	such	as	worker	sterility	in	eusocial	
insects	 (Fig.	2b).	 Our	 results	 show	 that	 in	 two-	species	 associations,	
whole-	genome	association	 also	 allows	 costly	 interspecific	 behaviors	
to	be	stable.	Biological	instances	of	such	associations	may	seem	hard	
to	 conceive	of;	we	 suggest	 that	 even	 if	 this	 is	 the	 case,	 theory	has	
previously	led	the	way	to	discovery	of	real	biological	phenomena,	with	
greenbeard	traits	themselves	being	a	case	in	point	(Gardner	&	West,	
2010).	 We	 further	 suggest	 that	 stable	 endosymbioses,	 particularly	
those	 in	which	 endosymbionts	 are	 perfectly	 heritable,	 may	 provide	
the	kind	of	interspecies	association	that	corresponds	to	our	model	of	
costly	interspecies	donation.
Previous	work	 has	 shown	 that	 costly	 interspecies	 donation	 can	
be	 analyzed	 as	 instances	 of	within-	species	 altruism,	 but	 that	 a	 be-
tween	 species	 altruism	 interpretation	 is	 also	 possible	 (Wyatt	 et	al.,	
2013).	However,	we	argue	 that	 it	 is	 arbitrary	 to	 terminate	 the	path	
of	 received	 benefits	 in	 the	 partner	 species,	when	 it	 continues	 back	
to	conspecific	 relatives	of	 the	 focal	 actor.	Thus,	we	 favor	 treatment	
of	costly	between-	species	donation	as	within-	species	altruism,	using	
the	partner	species	as	a	vector	(Queller,	2011).	For	example,	lichens,	
which	are	symbiotic	combinations	of	fungi	and	photosynthetic	algae	
or	cyanobacteria	(Fig.	2d),	meet	this	interpretation	since	the	associa-
tion	is	stable,	and	diffuse	benefits	from	the	partner	species	are	nec-
essarily	received	by	conspecifics	of	any	donating	 individual	 in	either	
species.	By	doing	so,	we	preserve	a	further	analogue	between	green-
beard	 theory	 and	mutualism	 theory.	When	possible	modifiers	 favor	
suppression	of	 greenbeards	within	 and	between	 species,	 this	 is	 be-
cause	direct	 fitness	 is	 increased	by	doing	so,	with	no	corresponding	
reduction	in	indirect	fitness.	This	is	the	case	as	social	partners	that	no	
longer	receive	donation	as	a	result	are	unrelated	at	the	modifier	locus	
on	average	(left	hand	column	of	Fig.	2).	On	the	other	hand,	modifiers	
are	 disfavored	 under	 genomewide	 association	 within	 and	 between	
species	because	indirect	fitness	losses	to	genetic,	within-	species,	rela-
tives	from	suppressing	costly	donation	more	than	outweigh	the	direct	
fitness	benefit	from	doing	so	(right	hand	column	of	Fig.	2).	Of	interest	
for	future	work	would	be	to	consider	the	impact	of	increasing	within-	
species	relatedness	on	the	selective	pressure	experienced	by	modifi-
ers	in	mutualisms,	given	that	within-	species	relatedness	in	single-	locus	
models	has	been	found	to	promote	the	evolution	of	mutualism	(Foster	
&	Wenseleers,	 2006),	 and	 given	 that	 in	models	 of	 greenbeards	 and	
modifiers	in	single	species	increased	relatedness	relaxes	the	selective	
F IGURE  2 Conceptual	framework	for	social	behavior	within	
and	between	species.	Costly	behaviors	can	experience	positive	
selection	either	due	to	association	between	social	alleles	at	a	subset	
of	the	genome,	or	through	genomewide	association	arising	from	
population	structure.	Within	single	species,	greenbeard	theory	shows	
that	association	between	social	alleles	at	a	subset	of	the	genome	is	
vulnerable	to	suppression	(illustrated	by	(a),	greenbeard	gene	csA	
in	Dictyostelium discoideum	(Queller	et	al.,	2003),	as	discussed	in	
the	main	text);	however,	when	relatedness	is	genomewide,	social	
behavior	is	stable	due	to	aligned	inclusive	fitness	interests	at	all	
loci	(illustrated	by	(b),	sterile	workers	in	honeypot	ants).	Our	results	
show	that	this	pattern	is	repeated	in	interactions	between	species;	
when	association	between	species	is	at	a	subset	of	the	genome,	
then	social	behavior	is	vulnerable	to	suppression	(illustrated	by	(c),	
plant–pollinator	associations,	as	discussed	in	the	main	text),	but	when	
association	between	species	is	genomewide,	social	behavior	is	stable	
and	can	be	understood	as	due	to	inclusive	fitness	benefits	with	each	
species,	using	the	partner	species	as	a	vector	for	altruism	(illustrated	
by	(d),	the	fungus-	algae/bacteria	association	in	lichen,	as	discussed	
in	the	main	text).	Photographs	(a,c,d)	by	Kevin	Foster.	Photograph	
(b)	by	Greg	Hume,	used	under	Creative	Commons	license	(http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/)
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pressure	for	suppression	of	greenbeard	donation	(Biernaskie,	West,	&	
Gardner,	2011).
We	conclude	by	considering	the	potential	biological	relevance	of	
our	results.	One	result	 is	that	stable	but	different	 levels	of	donation	
in	two	partner	species	are	possible	even	when	fitness	costs	and	ben-
efits	are	additive	and	 the	same	 from	both	species’	point	of	view.	 In	
single-	species	models,	 such	mixed-	equilibria	 occur	when	 fitness	 ef-
fects	interact	negatively	nonadditively,	and	when	relatedness	is	at	an	
intermediate	level	(Marshall,	2015;	Queller,	1984).	Here,	the	effect	is	
due	to	 the	addition	of	modifier	 loci,	and	the	complicated	evolution-
ary	dynamics	this	 introduces	(Appendix	S4:	Section	4.3.2)	 (Quickfall,	
2016)).	It	remains	to	be	seen	whether	this	is	a	mere	mathematical	cu-
riosity,	or	whether	aspects	of	it	may	be	of	relevance	in	understanding	
some	 real	 examples	 of	mutualism.	 In	 addition,	 our	 conceptual	 links	
between	the	evolution	of	mutualism	and	greenbeard	theory,	and	the	
conceptual	richness	of	the	latter	(Biernaskie	et	al.,	2011)	of	which	we	
have	explored	only	a	subset	here,	should	be	of	interest.	These	results	
and	links	arose	from	introducing	modifiers	into	simple	models	of	the	
evolution	of	mutualism,	and	we	hope	future	research	into	this	area	will	
be	motivated	in	consequence.
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